Excerpt from:
  
  
  
  
  Understanding the Federal Budget   
    
     
     
    
    
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    The federal deficit went from $74 billion in 
    1980 to $1.4 trillion in 2009 while the Gross National Debt went from $735 
    billion in 1980 to $16.7 trillion by the end of 2013. These numbers are 
    truly mystifying to those of us who have never had to worry about a million 
    dollars let alone a billion or a trillion. The purpose of this chapter is to 
    put these numbers in perspective and to give them concrete meaning in terms 
    of the magnitude of our federal deficit and debt problems. 
    
    We begin with a few basic concepts and definitions.
    
    The difference between the amount of money the 
    government takes in from taxes and other sources of revenue (its receipts) 
    and the amount it pays out in purchases of goods and services and other 
    kinds of expenditures (its expenditures or outlays) is officially called the
    surplus. When the government takes in less than it pays out this 
    difference is negative, and this negative surplus is referred to as the 
    deficit. The relationships between government receipts, expenditures, 
    and its surpluses/deficits from 1910 through 2013 are shown in Figure 1.1,
    both in absolute amounts and as a percent of GDP. 
	ource: 
    
    Office of Management and Budget (1.1
    
    1.2),
    
    Historical Statistics of the U.S. (Ca10)
    
    
    
    As can be seen in this figure, whenever the 
    government’s Receipts are greater than its Outlays the 
    Surplus is positive, and there is no deficit. Similarly, whenever the 
    government’s Receipts are less than its Outlays the Surplus 
    is negative, and a deficit results.
	
    Federal surpluses and deficits are related to 
    the national debt in that when the government takes in less than it pays out 
    it must borrow the difference (equal to the deficit) to finance its excess 
    expenditures. As a result, whenever there is a deficit the national debt 
    increases by (approximately) the amount of the deficit. Similarly, whenever 
    the government takes in more than it pays out the resulting surplus is 
    positive and can be used to pay off the national debt. Thus, the national 
    debt decreases by (approximately) the amount of the surplus.
    
    [3] 
    One way of viewing the relationship between the national debt and the 
    surplus/deficit is to think of the national debt as being the sum of all the 
    deficits and surpluses the federal government has experienced since its 
    inception. 
    Figure 1.2 shows the total federal 
    debt—commonly referred to as the National Debt—from 1916 through 
    2013, both in terms of absolute dollars and as a percent of
    
    Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
    
    
    Source: 
    
    Office of Management and Budget (7.1),
    
    
    Historical Statistics of the U.S.’s (Cj870)
    The federal debt is broken down into two 
    categories in Figure 1.2:
    
   
    The top line in Figure 1.2 plots the Gross National Debt, 
    which includes all debt instruments issued by the federal government, 
    including those held by federal agencies such as the Social Security 
    Administration. 
    
   
    The bottom line in Figure 1.2 plots the Net National Debt, 
    which is equal to Gross National Debt less federal debt instruments 
    held by federal agencies. Net National Debt is the portion of 
    Gross National Debt held by the public, that is, by private individuals, 
    businesses, financial institutions, and non-federal governmental 
    institutions and agencies both foreign and domestic. 
    At the end of 2013 Gross National Debt 
    stood at $16.7 trillion and Net National Debt at $12.0 trillion. Of 
    the $4.7 trillion difference,
    
    $2.7 trillion was held by the Social Security Administration in its 
    Old-Age Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) trust fund with another
    
    $0.3 trillion in its Medicare Hospital Insurance (HI) and Supplementary 
    Medical Insurance (SMI) trust funds—a total of $3.0 trillion. The remaining 
    $1.7 trillion was in the combined holdings of all other federal government 
    agencies. Throughout this eBook the terms “National Debt” and “federal debt” 
    will refer to Net National Debt, unless designated otherwise.
    Figure 1.1 is related to Figure 1.2 
    in that whenever the surplus is positive in Figure 1.1, the Net 
    National Debt shown in the top half of Figure 1.2 decreases by 
    (approximately) the amount of the surplus. Similarly, whenever the surplus 
    is negative yielding a deficit in Figure 1.1, the Net National 
    Debt shown in Figure 1.2 increases by (approximately) the amount 
    of the deficit.
    
    
    As has been noted, the variables in the above 
    figures are plotted both in terms of absolute values and as percentages of 
    GDP. It should be obvious from looking at these figures that the absolute 
    values do not tell us very much about the nature of our national debt 
    problem. Judging by the plots of absolute values in Figure 1.1 and 
    Figure 1.2 it would appear that there was no national debt or deficit 
    problem during World War II. Just the opposite was true, of course, as is 
    made clear by the fact that the Net National Debt had gone from 45% 
    of GDP in 1940 to 106% of GDP by 1946. 
    In attempting to understand the federal budget 
    as it relates to the economic system as a whole it is essential that the 
    numbers be examined in relative terms, that is, in relation to some other 
    variable in the economy. There are a number of ways this can be done, but, 
    for present purposes, I will use GDP as the point of reference, and budget 
    magnitudes will generally be expressed both in absolute terms and as a 
    percent of GDP.
    The reason for using GDP as the point of 
    reference is that GDP is a measure of the total value of all goods and 
    services produced in the domestic economic system, and as such, it gives us 
    a measure of the size of our economy. It also represents the total gross 
    income created in the process of producing domestic output in the economic 
    system. 
    Total gross income is important to understanding the national debt because 
    the national debt must be serviced—that is, the government must make both 
    interest and principal payments on this debt. The ability of the government 
    to service its debt without having to print money lies in its power to tax. 
    Since the main sources of the government’s tax revenues are from income and 
    payroll taxes, the ratio of national debt to GDP (gross income) gives a 
    measure of the relationship between the government’s debt and the tax base 
    available to service its debt. In general, an increase in the debt to GDP 
    ratio makes it more difficult for the government to service its debt; a 
    decrease in the debt to GDP ratio makes it easier for the government to 
    service its debt. 
    As for the government’s receipts, outlays, and 
    surplus, just as with the national debt, the ratios of these entities to GDP 
    give a rough measure of their relationship to the tax base on which they 
    ultimately depend. As such, these ratios play a crucial role in determining 
    the government’s ability to finance its expenditures from taxes. 
    It is also important to recognize that changes 
    in the GDP will cause changes in government expenditures and receipts. Since 
    GDP represents the total gross income earned in the economy, an increase in 
    GDP will automatically increase the amount of money taken in by the 
    government in the form of income, payroll, and other taxes. At the same 
    time, it will tend to decrease the level of government expenditures as 
    unemployment compensation, welfare, food stamps, and other governmental 
    assistance expenditures fall. By the same token, a fall in GDP will not only 
    cause tax receipts to fall, but will cause government expenditures to 
    increase as government assistance and other emergency expenditures increase. 
    Thus, a change in GDP will automatically affect the surplus or deficit as it 
    affects government revenues and expenditures: An increase in GDP will 
    automatically cause a surplus to increase or a deficit to decrease as tax 
    receipts increase and expenditures fall; a decrease in GDP will 
    automatically cause a surplus to decrease or a deficit to increase as tax 
    receipts fall and expenditures increase. As a result, changes in GDP also 
    affect the national debt.
    
    Next we look to see how and why the national 
    debt has changed since 1916.
    
    The debt ratio rose from 2.7% of GDP in 1916 to 
    33% of GDP by 1919 as a result of World War I, but had fallen back to 16% of 
    GDP by 1929. This feat was accomplished by keeping in place the
    
    personal and
    
    corporate income tax increases that were enacted to finance the war 
    until they were reduced somewhat in1925. 
    At the beginning of the Great Depression the 
    debt ratio rose again, this time to 46% of GDP by 1935. While it remained 
    high during the 1930s, as a result of the
    
    Revenue Act of 1932 and 
    
    other tax increase during the 1930s it 
    remained fairly stable following 1935 and stood at 44% of GDP in 
    1940. Then came the deficits of World War II. 
    By today’s standards, government expenditures 
    during the war were rather trivial in absolute terms, reaching a mere $92.7 
    billion in 1945. In relative terms they were huge, even by today’s 
    standards, amounting to over 40% of GDP from 1943 through 1945. At the same 
    time the deficit was also huge in relative terms. It reached 29.6% of GDP in 
    1943. The same is true of the national debt shown in Figure 1.2 which 
    grew to $271 billion for the Gross National Debt and $242 billion for
    Net National Debt by 1946. This amounted to 119% and 106% of GDP, 
    respectively. 
    The United States was saddled with a huge debt 
    burden at the end of the war as measured by the size of its net debt 
    relative to GDP, a burden that was systematically reduced over the following 
    29 years. 
    
    The federal budget was brought into balance 
    fairly quickly after World War II, achieving a surplus in 1947. Though there 
    were very few surpluses to follow, the budget was kept in fairly close 
    balance from 1947 through 1974. As is shown in Figure 1.1, except for 
    1959 and 1968, the deficit was never greater than 2% of GDP. This fairly 
    close balance allowed the debt to GDP ratio to fall, in spite of the 
    deficits, because it meant that the rate at which the debt increased 
    from 1947 through 1974 was less than the rate at which GDP increased 
    during this period.
    The primary mechanism by which the budget was 
    brought under control was, as will be shown in Chapter 2, by cutting defense 
    expenditures as a percent of GDP as other components of the government grew. 
    At the same time, much of the wartime tax structure was kept in place: The 
    top marginal income tax rate ranged from
    
    92% to 70% during this period; the top marginal corporate profits tax 
    rate ranged from
    
    53% to 48%, and the top marginal estate tax rate was
    
    77%. This tax structure made it possible for the government to raise the 
    requisite revenue as the economy adjusted to the war’s end and as government 
    expenditures grew throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
    A secondary factor that contributed to reducing 
    the debt burden was the policies of the Federal Reserve and Treasury. The 
    Treasury dominated the Federal Reserve during and immediately following the 
    war, a situation that continued until the
    
    1951 Federal Reserve-Treasury Accord that gave the Federal Reserve
    
    a certain degree of independence. (Bernanke) 
    The Treasury’s low interest rate policy preceding the Accord led to a 
    substantial increase in the supply of money. This, in turn, led to an 
    effective annual rate of inflation of 5.4% from 1946 through 1951, and a 33% 
    increase in the average price level was the result.
    
    In the presence of a fairly balanced budget, 
    the inflation that resulted from the Treasury’s low interest rate policy 
    contributed greatly to reducing the burden of the debt. Low interest rates 
    made it possible for the Treasury to refinance its debt as it came due at 
    minimal costs while the inflation increased GDP relative to the debt. The 
    effect was to cause the net debt to GDP ratio to fall from 106% in 1946 to 
    65% by 1951. This 38% (41 percentage point) decrease in the debt to GDP 
    ratio was accomplished in spite of the fact that the real output of goods 
    and services produced during that period increased by only 10% 
    and the actual debt fell by only 11%. 
    The rate of inflation was brought under control 
    after the Accord, and the effective annual rate of inflation was a modest 
    1.9% from 1952 through 1967. The debt to GDP ratio continued to fall 
    throughout this period even though the government continued to experience 
    deficits in its budget. The reason is that the production of goods and 
    services increased dramatically. 
    From 1952 through 1967 the output of goods and 
    services produced in the United States increased at an effective annual rate 
    of 3.4%. This led to a 78% increase in total output by 1967. When combined 
    with the 1.9% effective annual rate of inflation and the resulting 32% 
    increase in prices, the nominal value of GDP increased by 134% as Net 
    National Debt increased by only 24%. The result was a fall in the debt 
    to GDP ratio from 62% in 1951 to 31% by 1967. Thus, by 1967 the ratio of 
    debt to GDP was below that of 1940, and the debt burden created by World War 
    II had been completely eliminated 
    along with much of the burden created by the Great Depression.
     
    The
    
    Kennedy-Johnson tax cuts combined with the escalation of the Vietnam War 
    led to a deficit equal to 2.9% of GDP in 1968 that was converted into an 
    0.3% surplus in 1969 after the 1968
    
    Revenue and Expenditure Control Act imposed a 10% income tax surcharge 
    on individuals and corporations—the last surplus we were to see in the 
    federal budget until 1998. The budget remained relatively balanced through 
    1974, and the debt ratio continued to fall with only a slight rise when the 
    surcharge expired in 1970. 
    
    
    From 1965 through 1984 we experienced what 
    
    Alan Meltzer dubbed 
    
    The Great Inflation. As was noted above, from 
    1952 through 1967 the effective annual rate of inflation was 1.9%. From 1967 
    through 1982 it was 6.6% and from 1975 through 1981 it was 7.7%. Unlike the 
    1945-1951 inflation, this inflation contributed relatively little to 
    reducing the debt burden. 
    The 
    1973 
    
    Arab oil embargo with its concomitant 
    quadrupling of the price of oil caused the economy to falter. The resulting
    
    
    1973-1975 recession with its increase in 
    unemployment equal to 
    
    3.6% of the labor force caused the deficit to 
    increase in 1975 to 3.3% of GDP and to 4.1% of GDP in 1976 as the debt to 
    GDP ratio increased from 23% in 1974 to 27% by 1977. This ratio then fell 
    somewhat by 1981 and stood at 25% in at the end of that year. 
    The reason the inflation of 
    the 1970s had relatively little effect on reducing the debt burden is that 
    inflation can increase GDP relative to the debt only if inflation increases 
    GDP sufficiently to offset the rate at which the deficit increases the debt. 
    That didn’t happen in the 1970s. In fact, the effect of the inflation on the 
    deficit made the deficit worse than it otherwise would have been, especially 
    in the aftermath of the inflation. 
    Changes in prices have the 
    effect of transferring purchasing power—that is, wealth—between borrowers 
    and lenders. When prices rise over the period of a loan the money that is 
    lent can purchase more goods and services than the money that is paid back. 
    As a result, inflation has the effect of transferring wealth from lenders to 
    borrowers. Similarly, when prices decrease over the period of a loan the 
    money that is lent can purchase fewer goods and services than the money that 
    is paid back. As a result, deflation has the effect of transferring wealth 
    from borrowers to lenders. These transfers of wealth make the rate of 
    interest at which people are willing to borrow or lend depend crucially on 
    what they expect to happen to prices. Borrowers are less willing to 
    borrow at high interest rates when they expect prices to fall and anticipate 
    a loss in wealth from falling prices than when they expect prices to rise 
    and anticipate a gain in wealth from increasing prices. The opposite is true 
    for lenders; lenders are more willing to lend at low interest rates when 
    they expect prices to fall and anticipate a gain in wealth from falling 
    prices than when they expect prices to increase and anticipation a loss in 
    wealth from increasing prices. As a result, inflationary expectations tend 
    to lead to high interest rates, and deflationary expectations tend to lead 
    to low interest rates. 
    No one expected the inflation 
    that followed World War II. The greatest fear at the time was of recession 
    and falling prices as had been the case at the end of previous wars. World 
    War II broke that pattern, and before anyone realized it the lack of 
    inflationary expectations on the part of borrowers and lenders made it 
    possible for the Federal Reserve to maintain low interest rates during the 
    inflation of 1945 through 1951. As a result, the Treasury was able to 
    finance its deficits and rollover 
    its debt without adding significantly to the deficit. 
    This was not the case during
    
    The Great Inflation with inflationary expectations rising throughout the 
    period and remaining high into the 1990s. The effect of these rising and 
    high expectations on interest rates can be seen in Figure 1.3 which 
    shows the interest rates on various Treasury securities from 1941 through 
    2012. 
    
    
    Source: 
    
    Economic Report of the President, 2012 (B73PDF|XLS),
    
    Office of Management and Budget. (3.1)
    The spike in interest rates 
    from 1979 through 1982 was obviously caused by the tight monetary policy of 
    the Federal Reserve during that period, but interest rates remained high 
    from 1975 through 1990 even when the Fed’s monetary policy was not tight. 
    From 1975 through 1990, federal deficits had to be financed and the debt 
    rolled over at long-term interest rates above 7% and short-term rates above 
    4% and often above 6%. The effect of having to rollover the debt at these 
    exceptionally high interest rates is shown in Figure 1.3 by the 
    dramatic increase in interest paid by the federal government on the national 
    debt as a percent of GDP from 1975 through 1995. 
    
    The national debt rose dramatically following 
    1980, reaching a peak as a percent of GDP of 48% in 
    1993. This dramatic increase in debt was precipitated by the economic 
    recession of
    
    1981-1982 where unemployment increased by
    
    3.9% of the labor force. When combined with the tax cuts in the
    
    Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and the increase in national defense 
    expenditures from
    
    4.8% of GDP in 1980 to
    
    5.9% in 1987 during Reagan’s
    
    anti-Soviet defense buildup, the result was soaring deficits that led to 
    dramatic increases in the national debt. 
    The federal deficit averaged 0.39% of GDP in 
    the 1950s. Aided by the
    
    Kennedy-Johnson tax cuts and the escalation of the
    
    Vietnam War, the average federal deficit increased to 0.76% of GDP in 
    the 1960s, and, with the help of
    
    five additional legislative tax cuts in the 1970s, the average deficit 
    increased to 2.0% of GDP in the 1970s. Then came the tax cuts in 1981 and 
    the
    
    anti-Soviet defense buildup in the mid 980s, and the average deficit 
    rose to 4.1% of GDP during the Reagan years. 
    These increases in deficits and debt were 
    eventually brought under control by 1995, in spite of the
    
    1990-1991 recession that increased unemployment by
    
    2.2% of the labor force, and the debt ratio fell from 1996 through 2001. 
    This was accomplished as a result of the
    
    Clinton tax increases in 1993 along with
    
    nine other relatively minor tax increases that were enacted following 
    the 1981 tax cuts. There were also cuts in government expenditures from 1994 
    through 2000, mostly in defense following the end of the
    
    Cold War. A substantial increase in employment helped to reduce the 
    deficit as well as the unemployment rate fell from
    
    7.5% in 1992 to
    
    4.0% in 2000. Net National Debt stood at $3.3 trillion in 2001 
    which was just 33% of GDP compared to the peak of 
    51% it had reached in 1994. In addition, there had been a surplus in the 
    budget since 1998 which peaked at 2.3% of GDP in 2000. 
    Then came the 
    
    2001 recession, where unemployment increased by
    
    2.0% of the labor force, and the
    
    2001-2005 tax cuts, which led to a substantial loss in federal tax 
    revenue. When combined with the increase in defense expenditures that 
    accompanied the expansion of the
    
    war in Afghanistan into Iraq, the federal budget went from a surplus 
    equal to 2.3% of GDP in 2000 to a 3.4% deficit in 2004, and the debt ratio 
    went from 33% of GDP in 2001 to 37% in 2007. Then the housing bubble burst 
    and unemployment began to increase.
    The bursting of the housing bubble led to the
    
    2007-2009 recession and an increase in unemployment equal to
    
    5.0% of the labor force. In response, Congress passed the
    
    $152 Billion
    
    Economic Stimulus Act in February of 2008 to mitigate the effects of the 
    economic downturn and the $700 billion
    
    Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in October of that same year to 
    bail out our financial institutions in the midst of the
    
    2008 financial panic. Next came the $800 billion
    
    American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
    on February 17, 2009.
    Net National Debt
    jumped from 37% of GDP in 2007 to 52% of GDP by the end of 2009 and, 
    as a result of the financial crisis, the ensuing recession, and the efforts 
    to stabilize the economy following the crisis, had risen to 74% of GDP by 
    the end of 2013. As the government attempted to minimize the severity of the 
    economic catastrophe that was unfolding in the wake of the housing bubble 
    bursting the debt itself went from $5.0 trillion in 2007 to $12.0 trillion 
    by the end of 2013—a 140% increase in just 6 years—as the deficit reached 
    9.8% of GDP in 2009 and then decreased to 4.1% of GDP by 2013 as a result of 
    the economic recovery following 2009.
    
    
    In response to the rising federal debt, 
    Congress passed the
    
    Budget Control Act of 2011 as a condition for
    
    increasing the debt ceiling in that year. This Act requires a $1.2 
    trillion reduction in federal discretionary spending over ten years, half of 
    which is to come from cuts in defense expenditures and the other half from 
    cuts in non-defense expenditures. This legislated reduction in discretionary 
    spending (Sequestration) 
    is approximately
    
    25% of all discretionary spending in the federal budget, and Congress 
    must decide whether to allow these arbitrary spending cuts to take place or 
    whether to amend the law to keep this from happening. In the meantime, 
    Congress is deadlocked over whether our deficit problem should be solved 
    through tax increases or through expenditure cuts or some combination of the 
    two, and, as was noted in the Prologue, the American people seem to want to 
    solve the problem through expenditure cuts without actually cutting 
    expenditures. 
    This brings us back to the question posed in 
    the Prologue: Where are these cuts supposed to come from? The better part of 
    valor would suggest that we first look to see how the money in the federal 
    budget is actually spent and where it comes from before we attempt to answer 
    this question. 
    
    This Appendix elaborates on of some of the more technical aspects of 
    measuring total output and the average price level. It also examines the 
    relationship between changes in GDP, productivity, and employment.
    
    GDP is the total value of all goods and 
    services produced in the domestic economy. It is determined by multiplying 
    the quantities of goods and services produced by their respective prices and 
    summing to get the total value produced during a specific period of time. 
    Thus, GDP measures the rate at which the total value of goods and 
    services is produced. Since GDP is generally measured on an annual basis, it 
    also tells us the total value of the goods and services that were produced 
    in a given year. In addition, since the total value of goods and services 
    produced corresponds to the gross income earned in producing those goods and 
    services, 
    GDP also measures the rate at which total gross income is earned in the 
    domestic economy and, when measured on an annual basis, the amount of gross 
    income earned during a given year. 
    Employment is related to the quantities of 
    goods and services produced, not their values as such. If we want a measure 
    of total output that is related to total employment we must adjust the 
    nominal or money value of GDP for changes in prices. This is normally 
    done by choosing the prices that exist at a particular point in time (or 
    averages of prices over a particular period of time) and using those prices 
    to measure the value of the output of goods and serves produced at other 
    points in time. When the value of GDP is measured in this way the result is 
    referred to as real GDP or GDP in constant prices, base 
    year prices, or in base year dollars. Since real GDP is measured 
    by holding prices constant, changes in real GDP can occur only if quantities 
    change. Hence, real GDP gives us a way to measure changes in the sum of all 
    the quantities of output produced. 
    Nominal GDP and Real GDP measured 
    in 2009 prices are plotted in Figure 1.4 from 1901 through 2013 using 
    data from the
    
    Historical Statistics of the U.S. (Ca9, 
    Ca10) for the years 1901 through 1928 and from the
    
    Bureau of Economic Analysis (1.1.5
    
    
    1.1.6) for the years 1929 through 
    2010. Nominal GDP and Real GDP in Figure 1.4 are, of 
    course, the same in 2009 since that is the base year—the year from 
    which the prices used to measure the value of the output produced in all of 
    the years were obtained.
    
    
    Source: 
    
    Bureau of Economic Analysis. (1.1.5
    
    1.1.6)
    
    Historical Statistics of the U.S. (Ca9, 
    Ca10)
    The values of Nominal GDP are 
    below those of Real GDP in the years preceding 2009 in Figure 1.4
    because prices in those years were, on average, lower than they were in 
    2009. As a result, the value of Nominal GDP measured in current 
    prices—that is, in prices that existed at the time—in those years 
    underestimate the differences in the total quantity of output produced 
    relative to that produced in 2009. Similarly, the values of Nominal GDP 
    are above those of Real GDP in the years following 2009 
    because prices in those years were, on average, higher than they were in 
    2009. As a result, the value of Nominal GDP in those years 
    overestimate the differences in total quantity of output produced relative 
    to that produced in 2009.
    
    The year to year percentage changes in Real 
    GDP are also plotted in Figure 1.4 (Changes in Output).
    These rates of change give us a measure of the rates as which aggregate 
    (i.e., total) output changed from year to year. 
    Finally, it should be noted that what we are 
    doing here is adding apples and oranges which, of course, everybody knows 
    you can't do. But the fact is, you can add apples and oranges if you have a 
    common unit of measurement, such as pounds or bushels. It is important to 
    remember, however, that when you do this you don't end up with either apples 
    or oranges, but, rather, pounds or bushels of fruit, and the sum tells us 
    nothing at all about the kind of fruit that is included in the result. In 
    measuring the total output produced within the economy, the common unit of 
    measurement is the monetary unit, dollars, and the result of summing the 
    various outputs of goods and services produced as measured in dollars is the 
    total value of output produced—the real value if prices are 
    held constant over time or the current or nominal value if the 
    prices that are current at the time are used. In either case, the sum 
    tells us nothing at all about the composition of the total or how the 
    composition changes over time. It only tells us the value of the 
    output produced. This apples and oranges problem is intrinsic in all 
    aggregate measures (measures arrived at by adding to obtain a total) of 
    disparate economic variables.
    
    Since the difference between the value of 
    nominal GDP and real GDP in each year is caused by the differences between 
    current year prices and the prices that existed in the base year (2009 in 
    Figure 1.4), if we divide nominal GDP by real GDP and multiply by 100 
    the result is a price index that expresses the weighted average (weighted by 
    current year quantities produced) of current year prices to base year prices 
    as a percent of base year prices. This index is called the
    
    Implicit GDP Deflator. A measure of the rate of inflation that includes 
    all goods and services that are produced within the economic system can be 
    obtained from this index by calculating its year to year percentage changes.
    
    The Implicit GDP Deflator in 2009 prices is 
    plotted from 1900 through 2013 in Figure 1.5 using the GDP deflator 
    implicit in the
    
    Historical Statistics of the U.S. (Ca10) 
    for the years 1900 through 1928 and in the series published by the
    
    Bureau of Economic Analysis (1.1.5) 
    for the years 1929 through 2013. The year to year percentage changes in this 
    index that give the rate of inflation—that is, the rate of change in the 
    average price as measured by the index—for each year is also plotted in this 
    figure. 
	
	
 
    
    Source: 
    
    Bureau of Economic Analysis. (1.1.5)
    
    Historical Statistics of the U.S. (Ca10)
    While the Implicit GDP 
    Deflator provides a measure of the average price level of all 
    goods and services produced in the economic system, the 
    
    Consumer Price Index (CPI) provides a measure of the average price level 
    of those goods and services that consumers purchase. It is 
    constructed by surveying consumers to determine how they spend their incomes 
    and creating a representative market basket that contains goods and services 
    in proportion to the averages of the goods and services purchased by the 
    consumers surveyed. Since the quantities in this market basket are fixed, 
    and value of this market basket changes as prices change over time, if we 
    divide the value of the market basket in each year by the value of the 
    market basket in some base year and multiply by 100, the result is an index 
    that expresses the weighted average (weighted by the quantities in the 
    representative market basket) of current year prices to base year prices as 
    a percent of base year prices. A measure of the rate of inflation as it 
    affects consumers can be obtained from this index by calculating its 
    year to year percentage changes.
    The Consumer Price Index (which uses the 
    average value of the market basket for the period from1982 through 1984 for 
    the base year) is plotted from 1913 through 2013 in Figure 1.6. The 
    year to year percentage changes in this index are also plotted in this 
    figure. 
    
	
    
    Source: 
    
    Bureau of Labor Statistics.
    
     
    
    We can use real GDP as a measure of the output 
    of goods and services produced in the economy, and by taking the year to 
    year percentage change in this measure we can calculate the rate at 
    which total output increases or decreases in each year. These rates are 
    plotted in the bottom graph in Figure 1.4. They are important because 
    the level of employment over time depends, in part, on the quantity of 
    output produced. In general, an increase in the quantity of output produced 
    is associated with an increase in employment and a decrease in the quantity 
    of output produced is associated with a decrease in employment. However, the 
    level of employment not only depends on the quantity of output produced, it 
    also depends on the way in which output is produced. 
    The reason is that the amounts and kinds of 
    tools and equipment and the ways things are done tend to increase and 
    improve over time. These increases in the capital stock (tools and 
    equipment) and improvements in technology (ways of doing things) tend to 
    increase the productivity of labor over time which means they 
    increase the amount of output a given number of workers can produce during a 
    given amount of time. As a result, in order to maintain a given level of 
    employment, real GDP must increase over time at the rate labor productivity 
    increases. By the same token, in order to increase the level of employment 
    real GDP must increase at a rate that is greater than the rate at which 
    labor productivity increases.
    The
    
    Bureau of Labor Statistics’ productivity index of output per hour is 
    plotted in Figure 1.7 from 1965 through 2013 along with the 
    percentage changes in this index. The percentage changes in this index give 
    the year to year rates at which labor productivity changed during each year. 
	
	
    
    Source:
    
    Economic Report of the President, 2014. (B49PDF|XLS)
    From 1965 through 2013 this index increased 
    from 39.4 to 106.2 which implies an effective annual rate of increase equal 
    to 2.1% per year. This means that real GDP had to increase, on average, by 
    2.1% per year over the previous 48 years just to maintain the level of 
    employment that existed in 1965. It also means that during those 48 years it 
    was necessary for output to grow, on average, by 2.1% plus the rate at 
    which the labor force grew in order to keep the labor force fully 
    employed.
    
      
      Endnotes
      
      
        
        
         Until 
        1976 the federal government’s fiscal year began on July 1 of the 
        previous calendar year. Since 1977 the federal government’s fiscal year 
        has begun on October 1 of the previous calendar year.
        The 
        
        Office of Management and Budget (OMB's) 
        data as a percent of GDP only go back to 1930 and correspond to the 
        federal government's fiscal year rather than the calendar year. 
        Unfortunately, the OMB does not provide fiscal year GDP estimates for 
        the years before 1930. I use the OMB's estimates for fiscal year GDP 
        throughout this paper when looking at budget data, except for the years 
        before 1930. For the years before 1930 I use the mean of the current and 
        previous calendar years' GDP from the 
        
        Historical Statistics of the U.S. (Ca10) 
        to estimate the fiscal year value of GDP and divide this value into the 
        OMB’s fiscal year nominal values in its various tables to obtain the 
        fiscal year percentages of GDP. Using this methodology, the data from
        
        
        Historical Statistics 
        yields results that are identical, except for 
        rounding error, to the OMB’s fiscal year estimates of GDP for the years 
        in which these two series overlap. 
      
 
      
        
        
         This 
        relationship is not exact in that the government can borrow money it 
        doesn’t spend, thereby increasing the amount of cash it holds rather 
        than paying down debt, and it can spend money in excess of its revenue 
        without borrowing by reducing its holdings of cash. The government can 
        also affect its cash/debt holdings by buying and selling assets that 
        are, by definition, not included in its expenditures or revenue. See the
        
        Bureau of Economic Analysis's
        
        Table 3.2 for a discussion of this aspect of the budgeting process.
 
      
      
        
        
         See 
        footnote 3 for the qualifications to this rule.
 
      
        
        
         In 
        addition, GDP is related to the total levels of output produced and 
        employment as well as to the level of total gross income. 
        Some of the more technical concepts relating to GDP, employment, output, 
        and income are explained in the Appendix at the end of this chapter.
        
      
 
      
      
        
        
         These 
        effective annual rates of inflation, as well as those that follow, are 
        calculated from the 2009 base year GDP (chained) Price Index published 
        by OMB in
        
        Table 10.1. The effective annual rates used throughout this paper 
        are calculated from the compound interest formula:
        
        where 
        
        
        
        
        This formula assumes 
        annual rather than continuous compounding. 
        (See the Appendix at the end of this chapter for a discussion of 
        price indices.)
 
      
        
        
         This 
        value was computed by deflating OMB’s fiscal year GDP in
        
        Table 0.1 by the 2009 base year GDP (chained) Price Index in this 
        table and calculating the percentage change in the resulting real value 
        of GDP measured in 2009 prices from 1945 through 1951. Changes in fiscal 
        year output will be measured in this way in what follows. (See the 
        Appendix at the end of this chapter.)
 
      
        
        
         The 
        debt ratio actually fell below its 1940 level in 1962.
 
      
        
        
         
        Approximately one third of the national debt is in the form of Treasury 
        bills that mature in less than one year and one half is in the form of 
        Treasury notes that mature in less than ten years. (B87PDF-XLS) 
        When there is a deficit in the federal budget, the debt obligations of 
        the government must be paid when they come due by the government issuing 
        new debt instruments in order to obtain the cash necessary to pay off 
        the old debt instruments—that is, the Treasury must rollover its 
        debt.
      
 
      
        
        
         See
        Where Did All The Money Go? for a comprehensive analysis of the 
        events leading up to the financial crisis of 2008 and the fallout from 
        that crisis.
 
      
        
        
         Since 
        the profit earned by the owners of a business is defined as the value of 
        goods and services produced by the business less the incomes paid out by 
        the business to others in the process of producing goods and services, 
        when we add total profits to all of the other kinds of income earned in 
        producing the total output to get total income, the result is equal to 
        the value of total output. Thus, given the residual nature of profits in 
        the national income accounting system, the value of total output is by 
        definition equal to the value of output produced.
 
      
        
        
         For a 
        discussion of some of the problems inherent in attempting to measure 
        real GDP in this way, see
        
        Vollrath.
 
      
        
        
         For a 
        discussion of what GDP measures and what it doesn’t measure along with a 
        comprehensive examination of the implications of how economic variables 
        are measured see
        
        Kleinbard.
 
     
     
    
     